Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Volume 38
Number 1 Symposium—Intellectual Property at
a Crossroads: The Use of the Past in Intellectual
Property Jurisprudence

Article 5

9-1-2004

Digital Property/Analog History
Susan Scafidi

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Susan Scafidi, Digital Property/Analog History, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 245 (2004).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol38/iss1/5

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School.
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

DIGITAL PROPERTY/ANALOG HISTORY
Susan Scafidi*
I. INTRODUCTION

Intellectual property law takes pride in its cutting-edge status, its
central role in the Information Age. While traditional fields regulate
the real and the concrete, intellectual property contemplates the
virtual and the intangible. Its practitioners envision boundaries apart
from the physical realm,' describe previously unknown creations of
the human mind, and distinguish original promptings of genius from
the routine and the derivative. The cultural significance and
constructed nature of intellectual property are apparent in the public
debates surrounding everything from health care-related patents to
music file sharing. Intellectual property law is, in short, a twentyfirst-century discipline, focused on the future of innovation.
The use of the past in American intellectual property
jurisprudence, however, remains tethered to a view of history largely
associated with the nineteenth century.
As implicit in the
constitutional justification for granting patents and copyrights, "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," 2 the rhetoric of
intellectual property resonates with what is critically termed the
"Whig interpretation of history." 3 This "winner's history" approach

*
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Southern Methodist University. Thanks are due to Professor Peter Yu for the
invitation to participate in this symposium, to Brianna Fuller, Lisa Trifiletti,
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esteemed colleague Jeff Trexler.

1. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries ofPrivate Property, 108 YALE
L.J. 1163, 1174 (1999).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

(NORTON 1965) (1931). For alternative interpretations of the concept of
"progress" in intellectual property law, see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186
(2003); Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining
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to historiography, which today functions as a dismissive epithet
rather than a professional method, is characterized by a tendency "to
emphasise certain principles of progress in the past and to produce ' a4
story which is the ratification if not the glorification of the present.
Historians are warned to exercise caution not only with respect to
anachronistic interpretation of the past, but also in regard to claims of
linear, teleological movement and sequential improvement. 5 In other
words, the historical profession has become skeptical of "progress."
Intellectual property policy, by contrast, rests upon a faith in the
novel and the original and a belief that their creation and
dissemination can be harnessed to serve the public good. Such
reflexive optimism defined the intellectual property realm in the
early Republic, and continues to define it in our own era. The 1994
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS), to date the most far-reaching international agreement on
intellectual property, describes its objectives as follows: "The
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology... in a manner conducive
to social and economic welfare .... ,,6
While neither the
Constitution nor TRIPS assumes that the social benefits of
innovation are self-executing, intellectual property jurisprudence
displays a persistent confidence in the concept of societal
improvement driven by the products of human creative endeavorprogress rather than mere change. 7 This socio-technological
Darwinism forms the basis of legal policies that encourage and
reward ever more innovation.
In addition to its perspective on "progress," intellectual property
jurisprudence operates via largely unquestioned assumptions
regarding factual truth and objectivity. Agency in the creation of
"Progress" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution,
or Introducingthe ProgressClause, 80 NEB. L. REv. 754 (2001).
4. BUTrERFIELD, supra note 3, at v.

5. See id.
6. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round,
vol. 31, 33 ILM 1125, 1197 (1994).
7. See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99
(1951).
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intellectual property, for example, is assigned to a clearly defined
realm of authors and inventors. American intellectual property law,
particularly in the realm of patents, assumes its ability to recognize
the first appearance of an invention or scientific publication.8
Similarly, copyright and trademark both presume to distinguish
copying from independent production. 9 Despite frequent examples
of laboratories on different continents engaging in near-simultaneous
Nobel prize-worthy invention, Hollywood movies from competing
studios sharing markedly similar plots, or a plethora of companies
attempting to register e- or i- trademarks in the late 1990s, the law
crowns persons rather than cultural trends with the laurels of
authorship. Rarely the result of historical reflection and perspective,
the rewards of intellectual property protection instead arise at or near
the birth of an apparently new creation.
This simple, linear approach to stories of creation is echoed in
intellectual property law's treatment of works of history themselves.
If historians merely collect and organize "facts" regarding the past
and its march to the present, reasons the law, then works of history
are entitled to extremely limited protection.' 0 One court notes that
"the scope of copyright in historical accounts is narrow indeed,
embracing no more than the author's original expression of particular
facts and theories already in the public domain .... [C]laims of
copyright infringement where works of history are at issue are rarely
successful."" While historians are engaged in active debate over the
possibility of objectivity and the concept of truth in relating the
past, 12 intellectual property jurisprudence depicts history as a science

8. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (setting forth novelty requirement for
patentability).
9. See, e.g., Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 103 (1951) (noting that copyright
protection is available even for an independently created work "completely
identical with what went before"); Lanham Act § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)
(2002) (providing for concurrent registration of a trademark when more than
one party is entitled to use the mark in commerce).

10. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.
1980).

11. Id.

12. See, e.g., PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY
523 (1988); JOYCE
APPLEBY ET AL., TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY 73 (1994).
QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION
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of discovery (or perhaps recovery) rather than creation.' 3 In the eyes
of intellectual property law, Clio is less a muse than a file clerk.
The intent of the following pages is to highlight examples of
intellectual property law's perspective on history and to re-evaluate
some of the underlying assumptions of intellectual property
jurisprudence in light of developments in the field of history. After a
brief discussion of the development of American historiography in
the first section, the second section goes on to explore the role of
invention and historical context in patent jurisprudence. Focusing on
a landmark decision from the early years of radio, this section
gathers insights from the history of science, social and cultural
history, and political history to argue that historical methods could
alter the study and practice of intellectual property law. In the third
section, a copyright dispute over the story of the slave ship Amistad
illuminates the treatment of history and historical fiction in
intellectual property jurisprudence. Were the law to develop a more
contemporary understanding of the field of history, it would arguably
grant more equitable protection to historians and the authors of
historical fiction. Finally, the conclusion goes on to suggest ways in
which modem historical methods might contribute to a more
nuanced approach to intellectual property, challenging the very
notions of progress and creativity that underlie this branch of law.
II. A HISTORICAL MOMENT
While a historiographic survey is beyond the scope of the
present discussion, it is necessary to pause for a moment and offer in
general terms a brief chronological perspective on theories and
methods of historical study. At its inception, the American historical
profession patterned itself on the models of German scholarship and
the scientific method. 14 Following the example of the natural
sciences, these post-Enlightenment strategies emphasized ostensibly
neutral, value-free observation and exposition of the past and the
steady progress of civilization.' 5 Like nature, human society was
thought to follow a positive evolutionary path.16 Nineteenth-century
historians' laboratories, like those of their modem counterparts, were
13. See Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 980.
14. NOVICK, supra note 12, at 21.
15. Id. at 25, 32-34.

16. See id. at 21.
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university libraries and seminars; historical documents were their
rigorously dissected objects of study. 17 History was neither merely a
record of names, dates, and places, nor a collection of oft-told tales
about past events, but a repository of universal laws of human
society and indeed of philosophical truth itself.' 8 The concepts of
progress and objectivity that continue to inform intellectual property
law were celebrated pillars of the historical method.
In the early decades of the twentieth century, however, reformminded historians began to abandon the deterministic assumptions of
the profession. While continuing to engage in "scientific" study of
the past, scholars questioned the earlier celebration of progress,
toppled the icons of a previous generation, introduced new and less
flattering social perspectives, and allowed a degree of indeterminacy
to influence their work. 19 French historian Marc Bloch, writing
shortly before he was captured and executed by the Nazis, ascribed
changes in the historical profession in part to changes in the concept
of science itself 20 According to Bloch:
Our mental climate has changed .... [W]e are much better
prepared to admit that a scholarly discipline may pretend to
the dignity of a science without insisting upon Euclidian
demonstrations or immutable laws of repetition. We find it
far easier to regard certainty and universality as questions of
degree. We no longer feel obliged to impose upon every
subject of knowledge a uniform intellectual pattern,
there, that
borrowed from natural science, since, even
21
pattern has ceased to be entirely applicable.
This increasingly critical approach to history grew in importance
22
after World War II, and it continues to influence the profession.
Beginning in the 1960s, a new theoretical challenge to the social
sciences, including history, appeared.23 Postmodernism and its
progeny questioned not only the idea of progress but also the
17. APPLEBY, supranote 12, at 72-73.
18. See HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 216 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford
University Press 1967) (1821).
19. See APPLEBY, supra note 12, at 137-42.
20. MARC BLOCH, THE HISTORIAN'S CRAFT 17 (Peter Putnam trans. 1953).
21. Id.
22. See NovICK, supra note 12, at 522.
23. Id. at 522-23.
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possibility of scientific objectivity itself.2 4 As historian Peter Novick
observes, "Most crucially, and across the board, the notion of a
determinate and unitary truth about the physical or social world,
approachable if not ultimately reachable, came to be seen by a
growing number of scholars as a chimera., 25 This set of
perspectives, echoing the Nietzschean view of historical culture "as a
fault and a defect in our time,"2 6 has enjoyed a mixed reception
within the various branches of the historical profession. 27 Both
practitioners and philosophers of history have nevertheless been
forced to reconsider the nature of truth and objectivity in the context
of studying the past.
Legal theory, in general, is more resonant with these broad
academic and historiographic trends than the field of intellectual
property would indicate. In the early twentieth century, the legal
realist movement subjected law to social-scientific investigation that
was similar in focus to the approach favored by contemporary
progressive historians. 28 Cutting-edge legal scholars, engaged in
various projects of reform, did not necessarily question the concept
of progress as readily as their counterparts in history departments.
Both lawyers and historians did, however, place their trust in the
scientific method and the truths that it could reveal. As in history,
law's faith in objective truth was challenged in the second half of the
twentieth century by the theories of postmodernism. In a self-styled
"guided tour" of the critical legal studies movement and its approach
to history, Robert Gordon describes its primary contribution as
having "added powerfully to the critique of the functionalistevolutionary vision that has so long dominated legal studies." 29 The
meeting of jurisprudence and postmodernity, in essence, challenged
law's historical and potential role as positive agent for social change.
Many scholars questioned or even feared the implications of this
24. See id. at 523.
25. Id.
26. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY 4 (Adrian
Collins trans., Macmillan Publ'g 1957) (1873-76).
27. APPLEBY, supra note 12, at 225.
28. See generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960
(1986); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995).
29. Robert Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 125

(1984).
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approach to law; Owen Fiss, at one point in his attack on the "new
nihilism," insisted simply, "The law evolves. There is progress in
the law.",30 The ultimate outcome of the postmodemist challenge to
law, like history, remains unclear. Both disciplines, however, have
been affected by forces of academic change in ways that underscore
the anachronistic aspects of intellectual property jurisprudence.
Following the practice in both history and the common law of
illustrating principle through narrative, the pair of case studies below
will demonstrate the limited historical sensibility of intellectual
property law.
HE? 3 1
III. "MARCONI PLAYS THE MAMBO"-OR DOES

When Guglielmo Marconi died in 1937, a front-page article in
32
the New York Times called him the "inventor of the wireless."
Additional articles eulogizing Marconi were even more effusive; a
description of broadcast tributes around the world heralded him as
the "Father of Radio." 33 While the front-page obituary noted that the
development of radio had been accompanied by patent lawsuits in
many nations, it claimed that Marconi had remained above such
squabbles and focused instead on developing new technologies, even
those that theorists claimed were impossible. 34 For his efforts,
Marconi shared the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1909, an impressive
a number of other
honor for a self-taught inventor. He also received
35
Italy.
native
his
and
Britain,
awards in America,
A mere six years after the celebrity inventor's death, however,
the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion that in the eyes of

30. Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34

STAN.

L. REV. 739, 750

(1982).
31. STARSHIP, We Built This City, on KNEE DEEP IN THE HOOPLA (RCA
1985). One publication recently placed this song first on its list of those with
the all-time worst lyrics, a distinction due in part to the allegedly obscure

historical reference to Guglielmo Marconi as the inventor of the radio. Joan

Anderman, "We Built This City" is Best of the Worst, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
24, 2004, at El (reporting on Blender magazine's list).
32. Marconi is Dead ofHeartAttack, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1937, at 1.
33. Leaders in Radio BroadcastEulogy, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1937, at 14.
34. Marconi is Dead ofHeartAttack, supra note 32.
35. Id.; see also GAVIN WEIGHTMAN, SIGNOR MARCONI'S MAGIC Box 228
(2003).
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many undermined Marconi's place in history. 36 The patent
infringement claims at issue in Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of
America v. United States dated back to World War I,3 a period in
which both allies and enemies realized the advantages of wireless
38
communication over vulnerable long-distance telegraph cables.
The Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America (Marconi
39
Company), which the government had taken over during the war,
argued that patents issued to its founder and others were infringed;
the United States countered by challenging the validity of those
patents.40 Although the Marconi Company had under federal
pressure transferred all of its assets to the newly formed Radio
Corporation of America in 1919,41 it retained its patent infringement
claims against the government. 42 A quarter-century later, during
another World War, the Supreme Court found that the majority of the
claims in Marconi patent number 763,772 were invalid in light of the
prior art, and it remanded the sole claim that a lower court had
declared valid and infringed for further consideration. 43 Some fortythree years after the initial application, and thirty-nine years after its
issuance,44 one of the patents that buttressed the Marconi legend was
essentially nullified.45
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, writing for the majority,
indicates an awareness of the historical, if not the political,
implications of the decision. 4 6 According to Chief Justice Stone,
"Marconi's reputation as the man who first achieved successful radio
transmission rests on his original patent... which is not here in
question. ' 47 The majority was nevertheless determined not to allow
Marconi's historic achievement to influence the Court. The opinion
continues, "That reputation, however well-deserved, does not entitle
36. See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1
(1943).
37. Id. at 5 n.1.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See WEIGHTMAN, supra note 35, at 268.
Id. at 282-83.
Marconi Wireless, 320 U.S. at 1.
WEIGHTMAN, supranote 35, at 283.
Marconi Wireless, 320 U.S. at 5 n. 1.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 60.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 37-38.
Id.
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him to a patent for every later improvement which he claims in the
radio field. Patent cases, like others, must be decided not by
weighing the reputations of the litigants, but by careful study of the
merits of their respective contentions and proofs. ' '4
Such
evenhanded treatment of a party, focusing upon reasoned analysis of
the controversy before the Court rather than impressionistic
deference to individual stature, is in itself an admirable approach to
jurisprudence. In this case, however, the Court's decision to ignore
the extralegal judgments of history obscures the potential
contributions of the history of science, cultural history, and political
history.
Two dissenting opinions highlight the limited perspective of the
majority in the Marconi case. Justice Felix Frankfurter, arguably
more flexible in his approach to jurisprudence than the Chief Justice,
wrote a brief and insightful dissent in which Justice Owen J. Roberts
joined. 49 This dissent's primary objection is that the majority
opinion adopts an anachronistic view of the patents and technical
writings that preceded the Marconi Company's patents. After
considering the difficulties associated with judicial review of patents,
Justice Frankfurter warns, "Above all, judges must avoid the subtle
temptation of taking scientific phenomena out of their
contemporaneous setting and reading them with a retrospective
eye." 5 ° Like other academics of the era, he describes scientific
advancement-which is, after all, the object of patent protection-as
an evolutionary process. 5 1 The dissent does not, however, privilege
the Court's own temporally and scientifically advanced perspective
over the judgment of Marconi's contemporaries. Indeed, Justice
Frankfurter casts doubt upon the ability of the modem mind to
interrogate the past, noting:
To find in 1943 that what Marconi did really did not
promote the progress of science because it had been
anticipated is more than a mirage of hindsight. Wireless is
so unconscious a part of us, like the automobile to the
modem child, that it is almost impossible to imagine

48. Id. at 38.
49. Id. at 62 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
50. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
51. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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ourselves back into the time when Marconi gave 52to the
world what for us is part of the order of our universe.
According to this frankly postmodem view, science may progress,
but post hoc judicial comprehension of what constitutes an instance
of scientific progress is more likely to be distorted and eroded than
enhanced over time. This is not because evidence is lost or
memories grow dim, but because decision makers are enmeshed in
the knowledge systems of their own eras. Once a principle is
discovered and incorporated into a social group's consciousness,
hindsight tends to anticipate its discovery. 53 According to media
theorist Marshall McLuhan:
Without any exception, in every human development, in
every discovery, all the effects come before the cause or the
discovery itself; so when the discovery is finally made,
everybody says, "Well, anybody could have seen that. The
time was ripe." About the time somebody discovers the
telephone, there are a thousand people who invent the
then the law courts are filled with suits for
telephone, and
54
generations.
In the Marconi case, the length of time between the initial patent
application and the ultimate invalidation of its claims, as well as the
prominence of the field of technology in question, heightens this
distorting effect.
Justice Wiley B. Rutledge, in a separate and more
the
importance
of
dissent,
underscores
comprehensive
contemporaneous judgment regarding scientific advancement, citing
both popular references and foreign'cases that vindicated Marconi's
claims.55 He also relies repeatedly on the publicly demonstrated,
measurable results of the inventor's efforts, noting, "School boys and
mechanics now could perform what Marconi did in 1900. But before
then wizards had tried and failed. 56 In addition, Justice Rutledge
52. Id. at 63. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
53. For a discussion of backward projection in the context of cognitive
theory, see MARK TURNER, COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 31-

35 (2001).
54. MARSHALL

MCLUHAN,

Living at the

UNDERSTANDING ME: LECTURES AND INTERVIEWS

Speed of Light, in
225, 239-40 (Stephanie

McLuhan & David Staines eds., 2003).

55. Marconi Wireless, 320 U.S. at 64-80 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 65 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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offers a description of the progress of science that emphasizes
modest advances along a single theoretical trajectory. In the words
of the dissent, "The invention was, so to speak, hovering in the
general climate of science, momentarily awaiting birth. But just the
57
right releasing touch had not been found. Marconi added it."
Given the large and distinguished field of scientists, many older and
better-trained than Marconi, engaged in the late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century race to enable wireless communication, Justice
Rutledge finds the majority's emphasis on conception and
description far less persuasive than his own measure of results. Even
a "short step forward,"
his dissent reminds the Court, is sufficient to
58
support a patent.
While the dissenting opinions in the Marconi case employ a
more nuanced historical approach to scientific development than
does the majority opinion, particularly in their emphasis on the
importance of contemporaneous evidence regarding an inventive
step, developments in historiography have still more to offer by way
of analysis.
A. The History of Science and the JudicialAnalysis of Progress
Drawing from the history of science, a retroactive application of
Thomas Kuhn's 1962 distinction between normal science and
paradigm shifts could add theoretical weight to the insights of both
Justice Frankfurter and Justice Rutledge. 59 Kuhn's now axiomatic
description of the progress of "normal science," defined as "research
firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements,
achievements
that some particular
scientific community
acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further
practice," explains the clustering60of similar experimental efforts to
achieve wireless communication. It is unsurprising that a scientific
community mesmerized by the mathematical prediction and
subsequent artificial creation of electromagnetic waves should

57. Id. at 66 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 65 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
59. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
10 (3d ed. 1996).
60. Id.

OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
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collectively rush to explore the new medium further. 6 1 Knowledge
of electromagnetic waves arguably constituted a Kuhnian paradigm
shift, establishing a new tradition of research in the field of physics
62
and attracting scientists who would develop its possibilities.
Marconi was one of those scientists. His claimed achievement was
not the establishment of a new scientific tradition, a paradigm shift,
but participation in the incremental development of an existing
Patent protection, as
understanding, a function of normal science.
Justice Rutledge points out, extends to both.6 4 The subtle advances

of normal science, however, are perhaps best appreciated by the
contemporaneous practitioners and decision makers who can
apprehend their role in the still crystallizing paradigm. Once the new
paradigm has become a mature science, to again employ Kuhn's
terminology, its basic principles are likely to appear obvious to
scientists, judges, and even the general public-until it is supplanted
by a later paradigm shift.65 Under these circumstances, as Justices
Frankfurter and Rutledge implicitly understood, justice requires
deference to the judgments of history rather than hindsight. 66 Were
the Court to have had access to Kuhn's theory at the time, the
majority might have reached a different conclusion, or at least
engaged the dissenting arguments.
Intellectual property
jurisprudence is purportedly engaged in the promotion and validation
of scientific progress; its practice could be enriched by an elaborated
historical understanding of the pattern of scientific development.
B. Socio-culturalHistory and the Legal Construction
of Inventorship

Social and cultural history, too, offer an enhanced perspective
on the legal recognition of invention. Marconi's fame as the inventor
of wireless telegraphy was so well established that Chief Justice
Stone took judicial notice of his place in history, even while denying

61. See WEIGHTMAN, supra note 35, at 14-15 (discussing the impact that
Heinrich Hertz's discovery of electromagnetic waves had on the scientific
community).
62. See KUHN, supra note 59, at 10-11.
63. Marconi Wireless, 320 U.S. at 65 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
64. Id (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
65. See KUHN, supra note 59.
66. Marconi Wireless, 320 U.S. at 66-67 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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the particular assertions before the Court. 6 7 Both dissents echo
Marconi's popular accolades as well. 68 One of the long-term effects
of the Court's decision, however, is the negative effect on Marconi's
reputation. A recent biography of one of his chief competitors,
Nikola Tesla, lists the case as evidence that popular history is
incorrect with respect to Marconi's preeminence in the field of
radio. 69 In addition, while Justice Rutledge in his dissent cites the
Encyclopedia Britannica as evidence of Marconi's "almost universal
repute,
the current online edition of that venerable reference work
notes the majority's decision and indicates that others appeared to
anticipate some of Marconi's claims. 7' These consequences to the
inventor's reputation, whether or not deserved, serve as a reminder
that intellectual property decisions exert more than economic impact.
The construction of inventorship in a patent case is recorded in social
and cultural terms as well. Whether the disputed invention is great
or small, its assignment to an individual becomes part of the
historical record. Such recognition of scientific achievement is an
important function of the patent system, given our Western
placement of the locus of creativity within the individual, which is
itself a reflection of cultural history. 72
C. PoliticalHistory and the JudicialRecognition
of Invention
Although political history is likely to play a significant role in
the outcome of only a few patent cases, it nevertheless calls attention
to the context in which both invention and decision making occur.
This context is particularly dramatic in Marconi Wireless, which
involved alleged United States government infringement of an
67. Id. at 37-38.

68. Id. at 62, 64 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
69. MARGARET CHENEY, TESLA: MAN OUT OF TIME 221 (Touchstone
2001) (1981).
70. Marconi Wireless, 320 U.S. at 64 & n.2 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
71. Guglielmo Marconi, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, at http://search.
eb.com/eb/article?eu=52059 (online ed. 2004) (incorrectly using the analogous
British patent number in a description of the U.S. Supreme Court case).
72. See Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering
Collectivity,

in

THE

CONSTRUCTION

OF

AUTHORSHIP:

TEXTUAL

15, 16 (Martha Woodmansee &
Peter Jaszi eds., 1994) (describing the origins of the modem concept of
authorship).
APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE
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invention of military significance during the First World War and
was decided during the Second World War.73 The inventor,
moreover, was an Italian citizen and a well known associate of
74
Benito Mussolini, who reportedly served as Marconi's best man.
During this time the U.S. was keenly aware of the significance of
scientific research for national defense, going so far as to empower
the Office of Alien Property to seize Tesla's papers after his death in
early 1943, despite the fact that he was a naturalized citizen. 75 Under
the circumstances, a neutral observer might reasonably wonder
whether patriotic interests influenced the Court in Marconi Wireless.
While neither progressive historians nor legal realists would be likely
to ignore this possibility, both the majority and the dissenting
opinions remain silent on the matter. 76 So long as technological
innovation occupies a significant place in the American national
consciousness, intellectual property jurisprudence would be
strengthened by an awareness of the sweep of political history.
Marconi Wireless is unusual on several levels: the significance
of the field of technology, the famous actors, the historical moment,
even the lengthy period of time between the alleged infringement and
the final decision. These larger-than-life characteristics nevertheless
illustrate the potential contribution of historical scholarship to patent
jurisprudence, even if the relevant questions would ordinarily operate
on a more limited scale. Whether or not the Marconi Company
would have prevailed before a more historically oriented Court, an
appreciation of historical analysis could have produced a narrative of
greater nuance and social relevance. From a more sophisticated
concept of the progress of science, to the social and cultural
significance of invention, to an understanding of the national
consciousness, historical methods could benefit the study and
practice of intellectual property law. In addition, as the next section
will suggest, an infusion of historical theory into intellectual property
jurisprudence could enhance the legal treatment of history itself.

73. See supra text accompanying notes 34-45.
74. Marconi is Dead ofHeartAttack, supra note 32; see also WEIGHTMAN,

supra note 35, at 288 (describing Marconi's relationship with Mussolini).
75. CHENEY, supra note 69, at 331.
76. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1 (1943).
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IV. "You Too UPHELD THE VEIL FROM CLIO'S BEAUTY" 77

Although the African slave trade was considered illegal under
Spanish law in the early nineteenth century, the lucrative transport of
human beings from West Africa to Cuba for sale nevertheless
continued-though occasionally with unexpected results. 78 One such
transaction occurred in 1839, when two Spanish planters bought 79a
number of people who had been kidnapped from the Mende region.
After the illegal sale, the purchasers engaged the schooner Amistad
to transport the slaves to plantations elsewhere in Cuba. 80 One night,
however, a group of the Mende captives broke free and took
command of the ship. 81 Two months later a U.S. Navy vessel
intercepted the Amistad in Long Island Sound and took the ship into
custody. 82 A legal battle involving both criminal charges and
property claims followed, culminating in the U.S. Supreme Court
with former President John Quincy Adams arguing for the freedom
of the alleged slaves. 83 The Court ultimately allowed the Mende men
and women to return to Africa on the grounds that they were not in
During the
fact legitimate property under Spanish law. 84
c616bre
of
the
abolitionist
The
Amistad
became
a
cause
proceedings,
movement, and it has continued to generate scholarly and popular
interest to the present day. 85
The most recent property battle over the passengers of the
Amistad involved the dramatic presentation of their history. In 1997,
prize-winning African-American novelist Barbara Chase-Riboud
sued Dreamworks, Inc., to block the distribution of director Steven
Spielberg's movie Amistad, claiming copyright infringement of her

77. JOHN KEATS, To Charles Cowden Clarke, in 4 THE COMPLETE WORKS
OF JOHN KEATS 6, 6 (1884) (referring to Clio, the muse of history).
78. See United States v. Libellants of the Schooner Amistad (The Amistad),
40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 593 (1841).
79. See id. at 587-88; Federal Judicial Center, Amistad: The FederalCourts
and the Challenge to Slavery, at http://www.fjc.gov/history/amistad.nsf (last
visited Sept. 1, 2004).
80. The Amistad, 40 U.S. at 587-88.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 538.
84. Id. at 593-96.
85. Federal Judicial Center, supranote 79.
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historical novel Echo of Lions.8 6 Despite the existence of numerous
similarities between the novel and the movie, as well as evidence that
the credited screenwriter had been involved in earlier efforts to
license the motion picture rights to Chase-Riboud's novel, a federal
district court concluded that there was insufficient reason to grant the
author a preliminary injunction. 87 Chase-Riboud dropped the lawsuit
shortly thereafter
and publicly complimented both the director and
88
film.
the
In its denial of Chase-Riboud's motion, the district court applied
a standard analysis of copyright infringement to the facts at hand.89
The Court initially established that the author held a copyright in the
allegedly infringed work and that the defendant had access to that
work. 90 Next, the Court turned to the more complex issue of whether
"substantial similarity" existed between the original novel and the
subsequent motion picture. 91 As part of the extrinsic or objective
comparison of the two works, it is first necessary to determine the
scope of original copyright protection, filtering out any
"unprotectable elements. '9
It is a commonplace of copyright
jurisprudence that the law protects only an author's expression, not
facts or ideas. 93
Similarity between unprotectable elements,
including "historical or contemporary facts, material traceable to
common sources or in the public domains, and scenes a faire,"94 as
well as cliches or general themes, may give rise to suspicion of
copying. Such similarities, however, do not constitute copyright
infringement. 95 The court is thus left to compare only bits and pieces
86. Chase-Riboud v. Dreamworks, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 1222, 1224 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
87. Id. at 1233.
88. Bernard Weinraub, PlagiarismSuit over "Amistad" is Withdrawn, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 1998, at A10.
89. Chase-Riboud,987 F. Supp. at 1224.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1225-26.
93. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
547-48 (1985).
94. Chase-Riboud, 987 F. Supp. at 1226 (quoting Walker v. Time Life
Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 430,435 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).

95. See id. For a more extensive discussion of the types of unprotectable
elements that may appear in a work of authorship, see Alexander v. Haley, 460
F. Supp. 40, 44-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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of the works in question, concluding in this case that Chase-Riboud
had not established a likelihood of success on the merits. 96 Had the
author created a work of purely imaginative fiction rather than an
embroidered and embellished retelling of history, she might have had
greater success against the motion picture studio. Her use of
of "thin" copyright
historical events, however, left her with the type
97
historians.
of
fate
the
often
so
is
that
protection
From the perspective of the historical profession, it can be
difficult to accept that "the protection afforded the copyright holder
has never extended to history, be it documented fact or explanatory
fe
of human endeavor, the practice of
hypothesis. ,,98 As in other fields
history would suffer a chilling effect from the removal of
documentary evidence from the public domain. 99 One historian's
fact, however, may be another's false interpretation. The generation
of historical narrative and theory can require years of advanced
study, months spent in dusty archives scattered around the world, and
countless solitary hours reading crumbling old tomes, faded letters,
or endless spirals of microfilm. Explaining to a historian that
intellectual property law views this lifelong effort as roughly
equivalent to the compilation of a telephone book is unlikely to elicit
a printable response. 1 The author of a Selden Society volume or a
critical edition will not be reassured by judicial acknowledgment that
"[e]ven within the field of fact works, there are gradations as to the

96. Chase-Riboud,987 F. Supp. at 1232. The court declined to apply the
second part of its test for infringement, an intrinsic or subjective comparison of
the works taken as a whole. Instead, the court found this inquiry to be better
suited to resolution at trial. Id. at 1226 n.4.
97. See Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 943 (10th Cir. 2002)
(quoting 4

MELVILLE

B.

NIMMER

& DAVID NIMMER,

NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

§ 13.03[A], at 13-28 (2000)).
98. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.
1980).
99. See generally

LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS

(2001)

(charging that too many constraints will stifle the Internet's promise of
innovation and that free resources are crucial to innovation.)
100. See Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352-56 (1991)
(noting in the context of a case involving alleged infringement of a telephone
directory that "sweat of the brow" is not protected under copyright
jurisprudence).
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relative proportion of fact and fancy. One may move from sparsely
embellished maps and directories to elegantly written biography."''
However proud a historian may be of her elegant prose, rest
assured that she does not think of her work as the product of mere
"fancy."
Indeed, the policy of granting more extensive legal
protection to fabrication or error than to meticulously researched
historical detail can appear counterintuitive, especially in light of the
constitutional mandate governing copyright and patent law. In a
field that often equates original scholarship with new theories or
insights into the past, moreover, intellectual property law's failure to
protect ideas seems almost anti-intellectual. While historians cannot
expect the law to replace professional standards or address every
instance of plagiarism, the protection available to works or history or
even historical fiction is extremely limited.
The history profession needs look no further than its own past to
explain this treatment of historical works in intellectual property law.
History's nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century emphasis
on the scientific method appears to have left a lasting impression on
intellectual property jurisprudence. 0 2 If history is analogous to the
natural sciences, then it follows that protection of its "discoveries"
should be similarly limited. It is well established that
[t]he laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas
have been held not patentable. Thus, a new mineral
discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is
not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not
nor could Newton
patent his celebrated law that E=mc2;
03
have patented the law of gravity.'
A new bit of information uncovered in an archive, Hegel's pattern of
thesis-antithesis-synthesis, or the enduring theory of Montesquieu's
L 'Espritdes lois correspondingly lie beyond the reach of intellectual
property protection. Like the scientist who publishes a description of

101. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563
(1985) (quoting Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications, 29 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 560, 563 (1982)).
102. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
103. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); see also Funk
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (holding that
manifestations of nature are not patentable).
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a new discovery, the historian is entitled only to minimal copyright
protection of her expression.
By clinging to this "scientific" approach to history, however,
intellectual property jurisprudence ignores at least a half-century of
historiographic development. Historians no longer unanimously
subscribe to the belief that they are engaged in a search for objective
4
laws of history. 10
truth, and few would claim to discern universal
The proportion of historical research that yields concrete,
unassailable facts is dwarfed by the amount of expressive material
generated by historians. Even the names, dates, and places that
apparently comprise the most straightforward part of the historical
record are often written in pencil--especially if the handwriting is
not one's own but that of a colleague in the field.
In constructing a narrative, moreover, the historian makes a
series of choices about what to include and how to characterize or
portray the past. Consider the following passage from Peter Brown's
classic, "elegantly written biography" of Augustine, originally
published in 1967 and reissued in 2000:
Instead, forests of olive-trees had come to cover the
hillsides of southern Numidia. Augustine could work all
night in Africa, his lamp stocked with plentiful supplies of
the coarse African oil: it was a comfort he would miss
during his stay in Italy. This oil came from little men, from
villages which lacked the swagger of the Roman towns.
These sturdy planters, suspicious of the outside world,
living in tight-knit communities, whose habits had changed
little since pre-historic times, had become the arbiters of the
a pious man; he lived
prosperity of Africa: "Here lies Dion,
05
trees."'
4000
80 years and planted
To what degree has Brown imagined this unfootnoted landscape?
Does he mean to imply that Augustine regularly worked all night by
lamplight, or is the biographer merely identifying with his subject?
And why should "little men" who once grew olives make a cameo
appearance in an academic study of a famous theologian? An
exercise of "analytic dissection" intended to cull unprotectable "fact"
104. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
105. PETER BROWN, AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO: A BIOGRAPHY 8 (2000) (citations
omitted).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 38:245

from the author's expression would misapprehend the nature of the
work. 106 Brown himself, in a preface explaining why he chose not to
update his original text in light of subsequent developments, states,
The biography was never meant to be a comprehensive
study of Augustine, valid for all times and so needing to be
kept up to date as if it were a scientific manual. It was a
book written at a particular time,
by a young man at a
07
scholarship.
in
moment
particular
Historical works in the wake of postmodernism are not easily
reduced to the objective categories enshrined in intellectual property
law.
Perhaps the most radical exponent of the indeterminacy of
historical study is Hayden White, who blurs the distinction between
0 8
history and fiction by emphasizing the "poetic nature" of both.'
According to White, "It is often said that history is a mixture of
science and art. But, while recent analytical philosophers have
succeeded in clarifying the extent to which history may be regarded
as a kind of science, very little attention has been given to its artistic
components."' 9
Although more traditional historians have
condemned White's "relativism, ' 10 his conclusion that a choice
among alternative visions of history ultimately rests on moral or
aesthetic rather than scientific grounds captures an important trend in
historiography.'
Intellectual property jurisprudence remains
insulated from this academic development, continuing to maintain its
colloquial view of works of history.
As one historian notes, "We seem to have reached an odd point
in our evolution where it is the historian who has to preach the
fragility of his own subject's truth-claims to those who have never
12
tried to construct them but none the less regard them as robust."
106. See Chase-Riboud v. Dreamworks, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 1222, 1226
(quoting Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 430, 435 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)).
107. BROWN, supra note 105, at vii.
108.

HAYDEN

WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION IN

at x-xi (1973).
109. Id.
110. NOvICK, supra note 12, at 599.
111. WHITE, supra note 108, at 433.

NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE,

112. MICHAEL BENTLEY, MODERN HISTORIOGRAPHY: AN INTRODUCTION

159-60 (1999).
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The law's failure to comprehend the nature of modem historical
inquiry has led to extremely thin copyright protection for both
scholarly works and historical fiction. Whether history is ultimately
judged, in constitutional terms, to be a Science or a useful Art, the
law should encourage and reward its practice. To this end,
intellectual property jurisprudence requires a more contemporary
understanding of the practice of history.
V. PAST AND FUTURE PERFECT

Intellectual property law, the great defender of digital property,
should not be content to settle for an analog version of history. Like
other areas of jurisprudence, intellectual property must instead
incorporate a useable theory of the past informed by current
scholarship. Only then can legal practice begin to reflect a more
subtle understanding of history as both an arbiter and an object of
human creativity.
At a systemic level, modem historiographic trends challenge
intellectual property to reevaluate the basic concept of progress and
the capacity of the judicial process to measure it. If society follows a
meandering rather than a teleological or even a cyclical path through
history, what is the role of a legal discipline intended to encourage
progress in human endeavor? And what is the measure of whether a
new development constitutes progress?
On an individual creative level, contemporary historiography
also calls into question assumptions regarding agency and
originality. If many new inventions are at least in part the result of
the sequential development of knowledge systems, to whom are such
creations attributable? How does communal influence affect the
concept of rewarding a particular person as the first to invent? What
is the social significance of the construction of inventorship or
authorship, and how is this construction affected by extralegal
forces? And in light of such creative indeterminacy, is originality or
novelty really any more valuable than industry?
The self-reflections of the historical profession, when introduced
into intellectual property jurisprudence, have the potential to affect
more than just the legal treatment of contested inventions or works of
history. Modem historical study, by holding a mirror to the
longstanding conventions of intellectual property law, can ultimately
reveal this branch of jurisprudence to itself.
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